





Timed Signatures and Zero-Knowledge Proofs –Timestamping in the Blockchain Era–

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Timestamping

- The time stamping process provides a temporal order among a set of events
- The newspapers have this feature

Why is Timestamping important?

- Proving the date of content creation (e.g. patents, keeping track of the history of goods)
- Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II): Any event required for trading venues has to be timestamped accordingly to a unique clock.

State of the art

- Server aided model [Haber, Stornetta '91]
- The previous approach has been improved in many aspects (e.g. [Buldas, Laanoja, Truu '17])
- Distributed scenarios:
 - 1. the documents can be jointly signed by n parties (incentive issues)
 - 2. using the blockchain (e.g. [Clark, Essex '12] OriginStamp, Guardtime)
- UC formalizations:
 - Server aided model [MSTS04]
 - Non-interactive timestamping via VDF [LSS19]

Tal Moran, Ronen Shaltiel, Amnon Ta-Shma: JoC

Landerreche, Schaffner, Stevens: ePrint

Timestamping via a distributed ledger



Timestamping via a distributed ledger





Christian Badertscher, Ueli Maurer, Daniel Tschudi, and Vassilis Zikas: CRYPTO17

Timestamping via a distributed ledger









GClock

 T_6

 T_7



 T_5

Genesis







At time T_7 the rabbit cannot be convinced that \square was signed before \square









The Ledger has no source of randomness

The ledger functionality is aimed to abstract the consensus layer of Blockchains!

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But Bitcoin/Ouroboros/Algorand... protocol does have "fresh" randomness!

- The *honest* miners' nonces
 - Implicit in all security proofs
- The honest miners' keys
- The honest miners' transactions

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Since Bitcoin/Ouroboros implements the ledger, its contents would have similar properties



- Functionality 9	LEDGER
C	The second
General: The function	onality is parametrized by four algorithms Validate, ExtendPolicy, Blockity, and predict-time, along
with two parameters w	indowsize, Delay $\in \mathbb{N}$. The functionality manages variables state, NXESC, Duffer, τ_L , and τ_{state} , as
Example above intra Example 2 $\in \mathbb{Z}$	my, scare := γ_{state} := nxcho := x, burler := y, $\gamma_L = 0$.
(initially set to emp	Algorithm ExtendPolicy for \mathcal{G}^{B}_{LKDGER}
Party managem	
and the (sub-set) o	function Expression $exp(\frac{\partial T}{\partial x})$ state $W = \mathbb{R}^{2}$ buffer $\mathcal{J}_{}$
P, H, P_{DS} are all :	We assume and be under an hor or the function has no ride effects
already then it is a	We assume can by value and netice the function has no state effects.
is $\tau_L > 0$, it is also	This Function implements the Extend Policy of the Bitcoin Leager.
from P_{DS} or H).	$\vec{\theta}_{res}$ = Demonstrate Permanent ($\vec{T}T$ state Petro better $\vec{\theta}_{res}$) = Extension if advances violates policy
A party is consider	$r_{M} \leftarrow Distributer X rescond to r_{H}, scare, scare, scare, r_{tates} j = b Extension is alversary violates policy.$
Upon receiving	Let τ_L be current ledger time (computed from I_R^{-1})
response (chock-p	Parse NxtBC as a vector ((hFlag ₁ , NxtBC ₁), · · · , (hFlag _n , NxtBC _n))
1. I	$\vec{N} \leftarrow \epsilon$ \triangleright Initialize Result
1. Let $\mathcal{P} \subseteq \mathcal{P}$	if state ≥ windowSize then > Determine time of the block which is windowSize blocks behind the state head
$\tau' < \tau_L - 1$	Set $\tau_{low} \leftarrow \vec{\tau}_{state}[state - windowSize + 1]$
2 H I may not	else
2. 11 J was rec	Set $\tau_{low} \leftarrow 0$
(a) Set 2	oldValidT×Missing ← false ▷ Flag to keep track whether old enough, valid transactions are inserted.
(-)	for each list NxtBC, of transaction IDs do
(b) Com	$\vec{N_c} \leftarrow \epsilon$
state	Use the txid contained in NxtBC, to determine the list of transactions
(c) For e	Let $t\mathbf{x} = (t\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, t\mathbf{x}_{ t =1:0})$ denote the transactions of NxtBC.
10. 11.11	if tr is not a con-base transaction then
(d) If the	return R.
204 10	
3. Depending	N
	$\int d\mathbf{r} = \frac{1}{2} \int d\mathbf{r} = $
- Subn	For $\mathbf{j} = 2$ to $ \mathbf{x} \mathbf{x} \mathbf{b}_{i} $ do
if I a	Set $at_i \leftarrow blockity_B(N_i)$
the r	if $ValidTx_B(tx_j, state st_i) = 0$ then
(a)	return N _{et} ▷ Default Extension if adversarial proposal is invalid
(b)	$N_i \leftarrow N_i tx_j$
(c)	Set $st_i \leftarrow blockifve(\vec{N}_i)$
- Read	if the proposal is declared to be an honest block, i.e., hFlag, = 1 then
If I	for each BIX = (tx txid $\tau' P_i$) \in buffer of an honest party P with time $\tau' < \tau_{in} = \frac{Delay}{2}$ do
retur	if Weinforce extended by -3 but as $d = \frac{3}{2}$ then
14-1	If $V_{\text{and}}(x_{k}(x_{k}, x_{k}, x_{k}, y_{k}) = 1 \text{ out } x_{k} \in N_{k}$ then
- Main	□ □ □ □ 0 dValid i xMissing ← true ▷ A transaction is missing in adversarial proposal.
about	$N \to N$
a000	state 🖛 state st
- The	Tstate - Tstate TL
#/1	$j \leftarrow \max\{\{v:ngoverse\} \cup \{k \mid st_k \in state \land proposal of st_k nad hFing = 1\}\}$ Determine most recent
(a)	nonestry-generated block in the interval behind the head.
(b)	If $ state - j \ge \eta$ then
	L return N _{df} ▷ Adversary proposed too few honestly generated blocks.
(c)	$if state \ge windowSize then$
- The	\triangleright Update τ_{1ew} : the time of the state block which is windowSize blocks behind the head of the current,
HI.	possibly extended state
A de	Set $\tau_{low} \leftarrow \tau_{state} state - windowSize + 1$
(2)	else
(4)	$-$ Set $\tau_{1ee} \leftarrow 0$
	if $\tau_L = \tau_{log} < \min Time_{vlates}$ then \Rightarrow Ensure that ledger does not proceed too fast
(b)	return c
- The	else if $\tau_{im} > 0$ and $\tau_i = \tau_{im} > \max$ Time views then \Rightarrow A sequence of blocks cannot take too much time.
If I	return Ne
adve	else if $\tau_{1,m} = 0$ and $\tau_{\ell} - \tau_{1,m} > 2 \cdot \max(\tau_{1,m})$ then \triangleright Bootstrapping cannot take too much time.
	return N ₄₄
-	else if oldValidTxMissing then > If not all old enough, valid transactions have been included.
I	return N _{ee}
I	return N
I	- 1000111 IV







$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	
Algorithm for Default State Extension	$\mathtt{tx}_{i,1},\ldots,\mathtt{tx}_{i,n_i}$ contained in \mathtt{st}_i \vartriangleright Initialize the genesis state
function DEFAULTEXTENSION(\vec{I}_{H}^{T} , state, NxtBC, buffer, \vec{r}_{state}) We assume call-by-value and hence the function has no side effects. The function returns a policy-compliant extension of the ledger state.	pin-base transaction return false
Let τ_L be current ledger time (computed from \mathcal{I}_{H}^{*}) Set $\mathcal{N}_{dt} \leftarrow tx_{qoin-base}$ of an honest miner Sort buffer according to time stamps and let $\tilde{tx} = (tx_1, \dots, tx_n)$ be the transactions in buffer Set $tx \leftarrow block(\mathcal{H}_{dt})$ repeat Let $\tilde{tx} = (tx_1, \dots, tx_n)$ be the current list of (remaining) transactions for $i = 1$ to n do if $Valid(Tx_0(tx_n, state st) = 1$ then $\left \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{N}_{dt} \leftarrow \mathcal{N}_{dt} tx_1 \\ \mathbb{R}_{move tx_n}(rom tx_n) \\ \mathbb{R}_{dt} = \mathcal{N}_{dt} tx_1 \\ \mathbb{R}_{dt} = \mathcal{N}_{dt} tx_1 \\ \mathbb{R}_{dt} = \mathcal{N}_{dt} tx_1 \\ \mathbb{R}_{dt} = tx \in tx \leftarrow block(\mathcal{H}_{dt}) \\ \mathbb{R}_{dt} = tx \in tx \in block(\mathcal{H}_{dt}) \\ \mathbb{R}_{dt} = tx = tx \in tx \in block(\mathcal{H}_{dt}) \\ \mathbb{R}_{dt} = tx = tx = tx \in block(\mathcal{H}_{dt}) \\ \mathbb{R}_{dt} = tx = tx$	$\geq D) \text{ then}$ case, the chain is non-trivial and the most recent block is a valid proof-of-work. $\hline C_1, \ldots, C_k)$ $\hline chain_D(\mathcal{C}, \mathtt{st}, q)$ with state $\tilde{\mathtt{st}}$. The state $\tilde{\mathtt{st}} \mathtt{st}$ is valid. $\triangleright \text{ Compute the pointer } \mathtt{s} \text{ of the new block}$ formly at random from $\{0, 1\}^{\kappa}$ and set $\mathbf{B} \leftarrow (\mathtt{s}, \mathtt{st}, \mathtt{n})$.
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$\label{eq:second} \hline \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$tx_{i,1}, \dots, tx_{i,n_i}$ contained in st_i \triangleright Initialize the genesis state sin-base transaction return false	
Let τ_L be current ledger time (computed from \overline{T}_{H}^{-1}) Set $\overline{\lambda}_{t} \leftarrow \tau_x^{on-base}$ of an honest miner Sort buffer according to time stamps and let $\mathbf{t} \mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_n)$ be the transactions in buffer Set $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow blockify_{\mathbf{G}}(\overline{\lambda}_{df})$ repeat Let $\mathbf{t} \mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_n)$ be the current list of (remaining) transactions for $i = 1$ to n do if $ValldTx_0(\mathbf{x}_n, \mathbf{s} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{z} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{s} \mathbf{t}) = 1$ then $\left[\begin{array}{c} \overline{\lambda}_{df} \leftarrow \overline{\lambda}_{df} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_n \\ \overline{\lambda}_{df} \leftarrow \mathbf{x}_{df} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_n \\ \overline{\lambda}_{df} \leftarrow \mathbf{x}_{df} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{x}_n \\ \overline{\lambda}_{df} \ \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t} \\ \overline{\lambda}_{df} \ \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t} \mathbf{t}$	$\geq D) \text{ then}$ case, the chain is non-trivial and the most recent block is a valid proof-of-work. $\hline C_1, \ldots, C_k)$ $\hline chain_D(\mathcal{C}, \text{st}, q)$ with state \mathfrak{st} . The state $\mathfrak{st} \mathfrak{st}$ is valid. $\triangleright \text{ Compute the pointer } \mathfrak{s} \text{ of the new block}$ formly at random from $\{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and set $\mathbf{B} \leftarrow \langle \mathfrak{s}, \mathfrak{st}, \mathfrak{n} \rangle$.	
If I adve If adve <	neen included.	

Functionality $\mathcal{G}_{LEDOREN}$ General: The functionality is parameters viabelise betay $\in \mathbb{N}$. The functionality manages viables state, ktBC, buffer, τ_L , and τ_{tests} , as described above. Initially, state = τ_{max}^{cost} = ktBC is $\tau_L = 0$. For each party $P_i \in \{$ (initially, istate = τ_{max}^{cost} = ktBC is $\tau_L = 0$. Party manager advective (not-set) Party manager is $\tau_L > 0$, it is all from P_{DS} or R_i . n_{DS} or R_i . R_{ST} is considered above. Initially, state = τ_{max}^{cost} = ktBC is $T_L = 0$. 1) and a current-state view state, := ε (initial cost) R_{ST} (initial $\tau_{ST} = 0$.) (initial cost) R_{ST} (initial $\tau_{ST} = 0$.) Algorithm ExtendPolicy $\mathcal{G}_{LSTOREN}^{T}$ $R_{ST} = 0$. Algorithm ExtendPolicy (T_{T} is tate, ktBC $R_{ST} = 0$.		
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if $ValidTx_B(tx_i, state st) = 1$ then $\tilde{N}_{at} \leftarrow \tilde{N}_{at} tx_i$ Remove tx, from t ^a	case, the chain is non-trivial and the most recent block is a valid proof-of-work.	125
$ \begin{array}{c} L \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ $	security from	A C
$\begin{array}{c} c \leftarrow 1 \\ \text{while } \tau_L - \tau_{1ov} > \max \\ \text{Set } N_c \leftarrow tx^{\text{con-base}} \text{ of al} \\ \vec{N}_{at} \leftarrow \vec{N}_{at} _{C_c} \end{array} \qquad $	ch	
$\begin{array}{c} c \leftarrow c+1 \\ \text{if } [\texttt{lattel} + c \geq \texttt{vindowSize then} \qquad \triangleright \ \texttt{Update} \ \tau_{\texttt{low}} \ \texttt{to the time of the state block which is \texttt{vindowSize} - c \\ \text{blocks behind the head.} \\ \ \texttt{Set} \ \tau_{\texttt{low}} \leftarrow \vec{\tau}_{\texttt{tattel}} \texttt{state} - \texttt{vindowSize} + c + 1] \\ \textbf{else} \\ \ \ \texttt{L} \ \ \texttt{Set} \ \tau_{\texttt{low}} \leftarrow 0 \\ \text{return} \ \ \vec{N}_{\texttt{ef}} \\ \end{array}$	$\succ \text{ Compute the pointer $$s$ of the new block}$ formly at random from $\{0,1\}^\kappa$ and set ${\bf B} \leftarrow ({\tt s}, {\tt st}, {\tt n}).$	
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- The adversary needs to insert a block whose nonce was issued within this window by the wrapper
- The window depends on chain growth, chain quality, and network delay



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Summary

- UC definitions of postdate, backdate and timed security for the notions of: signature, ZK and Signature of Knowledge
- Definition and construction of a weak-beacon in the strong ledger-hybrid model

Thank you